



Joint Discussion Paper 
Series in Economics 
by the Universities of 
Aachen · Gießen · Göttingen 





























This paper can be downloaded from 
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29 
 
Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg 
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg 







Göttingen  MAGKS Working Paper
The Eect of IMF Lending on the
Probability of Sovereign Debt Crises
Markus Jorra
October 14, 2010
This paper explores empirically how the adoption of IMF programs aects
sovereign risk over the medium term. We nd that IMF programs signi-
cantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approxi-
mately 1.5 to 2 percentage points. These results cannot be attributed to en-
dogeneity bias as they are supported by specications that explain sovereign
defaults and program participation simultaneously. Furthermore, IMF pro-
grams turn out to be especially detrimental to scal solvency when the Fund
distributes its resources to countries whose economic fundamentals are al-
ready weak. Our evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that
debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these circumstances. Other
explanations that point to the eects of debt dilution and the possibility of
IMF triggered debt runs, however, are also possible.
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11. Introduction
When the banking panic of the years 2007/2008 endangered the stability of the world-
wide nancial system governments stepped in by providing a mixture of generous public
guarantees and scal stimulus. Since then, the resulting large primary decits and
swollen debt burdens of many countries have brought sovereign risk back on the agenda
of investors, policy makers and economists alike. Even among developed economies some
countries - most notably Greece - experienced a dramatic loss of market condence and
saw the interest rates on their debt skyrocketing. In the search for a solution to the
problem of looming debt crises politicians of the European Union (EU) turned towards
the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund). Albeit its Articles of Agreement do
not provide the IMF with an explicitly stated mandate to ght sovereign debt crises1
the Fund's Executive Board answered the calls by approving a € 30 billion Stand-By
Arrangement for Greece on May 09, 2010 which was supplemented by further EU loans.
Spreads on Greece's ten year government bonds relative to Germany's, however, did not
return to pre-crisis levels, a mere 0.5 percentage points in the average, measured from
the introduction of the Euro in 2001 to the end of 2009. Instead, in August 2010 the
spread averaged 8.5 percentage points, not far below its maximum of 10.4 recorded on
the last trading day before the announcement of the rescue package.2
What has gone wrong? Surely, markets did not fail to realize that the exceptional large
lending amount covers Greece's estimated liquidity needs for an extended period. Are
there therefore other reasons to expect that IMF program participation is detrimental to
scal solvency over a longer horizon? Have previous IMF programs exerted a positive or
a negative inuence on sovereign risk? Only few authors have addressed these important
questions explicitly, which is surprising in face of the vast literature on the economic
eects of IMF interventions.3 Consequently, our paper aims to ll this gap by providing
a rst empirical study that relates program participation to actual default incidences.
Before turning to our empirical analysis it is useful to review the theoretical literature on
the relationship between IMF interventions and sovereign risk. This literature identies
four channels through which the IMF's presence alters the probability of subsequent
sovereign defaults. These channels focus on the direct eects of liquidity provision, its
1An indirect mandate may be deduced from the Fund's mission to help member countries with balance
of payment needs since these often coincide with sovereign debt service problems.
2Data on spreads refers to Reuters' Ecowin Government Benchmarks.
3Bird (2007) and Steinwand and Stone (2008) oer readable surveys on this topic.
2inuence on the governments' adjustment eort and on the role of conditionality and
seniority respectively. Our analysis, however, does not provide us with a clear-cut answer
to the question whether we should expect default probabilities to rise or to decrease in
the aftermath of IMF programs. Rather, the sign of the eect is disputed even at the
level of the individual channels. Liquidity provisions for example may as well prevent
(Fischer, 1999) as trigger a run on sovereign debt (Zettelmeyer, 2000). Furthermore, even
if emergency lending successfully fends o looming liquidity crises, it will also change the
incentives of local policy makers regarding their own adjustment eort. The strength
of economic fundamentals partly determines whether this results in a more prudent or
a laxer macroeconomic policy with corresponding consequences for long run sovereign
risk (Corsetti et al., 2006; Morris and Shin, 2006). The IMF therefore typically links
the disbursement of money to conditions which are designed to guarantee a sustainable
policy path, their impact, however, is often impaired by a lack of compliance. Finally,
its role as a de facto senior creditor enables the IMF to lend at lower interest rates which
clearly benets the sovereign debtor and private creditors alike (Saravia, 2010). Large
additional amounts of ocial lending, however, also increase the risk of future solvency
crises in the same way private lending does. A default on more junior private debt may
therefore become more and not less likely (Boz, 2009).
While the specic characteristics of IMF lending programs aect sovereign risk in several
ambiguous ways even less is known on the aggregate eect of program participation on
the likelihood of sovereign debt crises. We therefore investigate the IMF-default relation-
ship empirically using univariate and bivariate probit methods. Summarizing our main
results, we nd that IMF programs signicantly increase the risk of subsequent sovereign
defaults by approximately 1.5 to 2 percentage points. This nding can not be attributed
to endogeneity bias since the results for a specication that explains sovereign defaults
and program participation simultaneously strengthen our conclusions. Neither can the
results be explained by a lack of compliance with IMF conditionality. Further empirical
exercises show that the magnitude of the eect depends on economic fundamentals in a
way consistent with economic theory. However, we do not nd a default-risk reducing
eect of IMF interventions in any of our specications. Hence, we conclude that the
adoption of an IMF program seems to be no good news at all for private long-term
creditors.
The present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical
literature on the relationship between IMF programs and sovereign debt crises. Our
3empirical framework and our data basis are laid out in section 3. Section 4 presents the
results. The nal section concludes.
2. Review of the Literature
2.1. IMF Interventions and Sovereign Defaults: Theory
A vast theoretical literature deals with the eects of international nancial organiza-
tions' actions on the probability and magnitude of sovereign debt crises. This research
highlights several channels through which the IMF might inuence short and long-term
sovereign risk in either a positive or a negative way.
The rst channel focuses on the direct consequences of liquidity provision in the context
of a debt run. Using models with multiple equilibria many researchers starting with
Sachs (1984) show that self-fullling runs could lead to a default of an otherwise sol-
vent sovereign debtor.4 Acting as an international lender of last resort whose liquidity
provision renders the search for inecient sources of nance in the event of a run un-
necessary the IMF may prevent the occurrence of those crises in the rst place (Fischer,
1999). Subsequent research focuses on the question whether this conclusion still holds in
a realistic setting with only limited IMF resources. As a result two starkly dierent po-
sitions have emerged. Zettelmeyer (2000) argues that rescue packages which cover only
a fraction of the potential liquidity needs might not only fail to eliminate the possibility
of a crisis but even have counterproductive eects. In the worst case, the provision of
the liquidity that is demanded by short term investors can be the trigger that leads to a
debt run. Contrary to this view Corsetti et al. (2006) oer a more positive assessment of
limited IMF crisis lending using the framework of a global game. In their model ocial
lending induces a greater fraction of lenders to roll over their debt which lowers the
incidence of crises.
Second, programs designed to provide short term liquidity also inuence the incentives
of borrowing governments with regard to their policy stance. A moral hazard problem
may especially arise if the IMF fails to dierentiate between liquidity and solvency crises.
In this case, sovereign debtors have the incentive to neglect necessary but painful policy
4Alesina et al. (1990) and Cole and Kehoe (1996, 2000) provide other examples for open economy debt
run models.
4adjustments and rely on ocial emergency lending instead which is often characterized
by sizeable subsidy elements (Vaubel, 1983; Meltzer Commission, 2000). As a conse-
quence an ongoing IMF program may increase rather than decrease sovereign risk in the
medium and longer term if it is interpreted as a signal for further support. This eect,
however, is far from clear-cut as the modern work on global games by Corsetti et al.
(2006) and Morris and Shin (2006) has shown. In their models, liquidity provision can
as well induce debtor countries to undertake otherwise infeasible adjustment programs,
convincing short-term creditors to stay and thereby improving the fate of long-term
investors. This virtuous cycle, dubbed as `catalytic nance', is most likely to work in
an environment of neither too bad nor too good fundamentals. In other circumstances
country leaders will see ocial funding as a substitute for their own adjustment eort
and moral hazard will prevail.
A third strand of the literature points to the importance of conditionality in IMF pro-
grams.5 Policy conditions that accompany lending programs may inuence economic
outcomes either through their signalling function or by initiating policy improvements.
Regarding the rst point Marchesi and Thomas (1999) develop a model in which only
productive countries choose to incur the short term costs associated with an IMF pro-
gram. The participation decision therefore delivers an important signal to private in-
vestors which may respond with a debt relief or - in more general terms - with improved
capital market access for the debtor country. According to this line of argument we
should thus expect a lower default probability of countries which participate in an IMF
program (IMF program countries). Regarding the policy changes countries may be will-
ing to accept constraints on their sovereignty because it is in their own best interest6 or
because they are bribed and/or forced to do so. If the conditions imposed were justied
on economic grounds and enforcement is guaranteed crises should become less likely in
either case. However, both qualications have been questioned in the literature. As the
argument between prominent economists on the merits of IMF induced policy changes
during the Asian crisis documented by Conway (2006) shows uncertainty still surrounds
optimal policy design in times of crises (Bird, 2007). Even if the medicine prescribed
by IMF conditionality is the right one its eectiveness is questionable when compliance
is a major problem. With ocial compliance rates of 54% (IEO, 2007) the eect of
conditionality on default probabilities is at least uncertain.
5Dreher (2009) provides a highly readable survey on the theory and the empirical evidence of IMF
conditionality.
6The resolution of time inconsistency problems is the leading example, see Sachs (1989), Diwan and
Rodrik (1992), Fafchamps (1996) or Drazen (2002).
5Fourth, the perceived seniority of IMF debt7 has the potential to inuence the Fund's
lending decisions and the risk borne by private creditors. As Saravia (2010) points out,
seniority enables the IMF to provide larger amounts of new short-term debt at lower
interest rates to ll the liquidity gap of sovereign debtors without risking its shareholders'
money. IMF lending thus reduces both, the probability of liquidity crises and - through
the eect of lower interest rates - subsequent solvency crises. Overall, this leads to
an improvement of the position of private creditors despite the dilution of their claims.
Policy implications dier, however, if the assumption of a xed demand for new nancial
resources is dropped. Boz (2009) analysis the eects of senior IMF lending in these
circumstances invoking a `willingness to pay' framework. Since liquidity considerations
are absent in her model the only eect of a new ocial lending program is an increase
in total debt that leads to higher debt service in the future making a subsequent default
relativly more benecial from the debtor's point of view.
To sum up, IMF lending surely eects sovereign risk through several channels. The sign
of the eect, however, is disputed even at the level of the individual channels. Much
less is known on the relative strength of these channels and their potential interactions.8
Whether an IMF involvement decreases or increases the probability of a subsequent
default is therefore ultimately an empirical question.
2.2. Empirical Evidence
While an investigation of the eects of IMF interventions on sovereign default probabili-
ties has not yet been undertaken our research builds on the large empirical literature on
the economic consequences of IMF programs. Since most earlier studies do not control
for the problem of self-selection into IMF programs and a complete survey of this liter-
ature is beyond the scope of this paper we focus instead on some recent contributions
that are related to our own research agenda.9
IMF interventions may inuence sovereign risk through their impact on economic growth
7The perception of seniority can be justied empirically since according to Zettelmeyer and Joshi
(2005) `...the Fund has virtually always been repaid in the past'.
8A rare example of a quantitative assessment of the combined eect of more than one channel is
Boz (2009). Accounting for the eects of seniority and conditionality in a calibrated model of the
Argentinean economy she concludes that sovereign risk increases after the disbursement of IMF
loans.
9The survey articles written by Bird (2007) and Steinwand and Stone (2008) provide a more complete
overview of the research on causes and consequences of IMF programs.
6and macroeconomic policy. The nding of a negative (Barro and Lee, 2005; Dreher, 2006)
or at best insignicant (Atoyan and Conway, 2006) causal eect of IMF programs on
economic growth is troublesome in this respect since most theoretical models of sovereign
debt point to a higher incidence of crises in times of economic hardship. The evidence is
somewhat more encouraging for other factors potentially inuencing sovereign risk like
budget decits and money growth (Dreher, 2005).
A similar objective like ours is pursued in two recent papers that analyze the success
of IMF interventions in terms of crises prevention, both reaching an overwhelmingly
positive conclusion. Eichengreen et al. (2008) show that countries are less likely to
suer from sudden stops in the years following their participation in an IMF program.
This eect is less positive for countries with weak fundamentals which are already on
the brink of crisis. Dreher and Walter (2010) demonstrate that the IMF is also quite
successful in resolving currency crises. The existence of an IMF program in the previous
ve years reduces the probability of a subsequent currency crises by 20 percentage points.
Once in a crisis, however, program countries are more likely to devalue after a shorter
period of defense.
Finally and more closely related to our study some authors provide evidence on the
theoretical predictions of the catalytic nance literature. Mody and Saravia (2006) and
Eichengreen et al. (2006) tackle this issue by studying the impact of IMF programs on
sovereign borrowing costs using data from the primary market.10 In accordance with the
theoretical literature their evidence indicates that IMF programs improve the borrowing
terms of countries whose debt burdens and foreign reserves are in an intermediate range.
Market conditions worsen under a program if these conditions are not met, tting nicely
into the moral hazard view of IMF lending. Mody and Saravia (2006) further show
that a large part of the catalytic eects can be attributed to IMF programs that turned
precautionary, which means that the agreed lending lines have not been tapped. The
authors stress that this nding is in line with their preferred view that IMF interventions
act as a commitment device which does not rest on the actual disbursement of money.
However, a more critical interpretation that points to the omission of a relevant variable
inuencing both the need for IMF resources and sovereign bond spreads is also possible
(Cottarelli and Giannini, 2006).
Jensen (2004), Edwards (2006) and Bird and Rowlands (2009) follow a dierent approach
10 Ozler (1993) represents an earlier study on this subject. Ignoring the problem of self-selection into
Fund programs she nds that IMF interventions are associated with increased bond spreads.
7by looking at capital ows instead of spreads. A quite robust result from this research
agenda is that IMF programs not only fail to encourage capital inows but even lead
to capital ight. Since this may be the result of an increased perception of sovereign
risk and capital ight on its own renders successful future debt rollover less likely one
would expect higher default rates in the years following an IMF program. Interestingly
van der Veer and de Jong (2010) nd that catalysis seems to work for countries that do
not default in the years following an IMF intervention. In conjunction with the afore
mentioned results this implies that later defaulters suer from massive capital outows
while participating in an IMF program.
Our paper extends the literature by providing a direct investigation of the relationship
between IMF programs and sovereign defaults. Looking at actual default incidences
is warranted since - as the discussion on the IMF loan to Greece in 2010 has shown -
staving o default is a major policy objective. Information on the success of past IMF
programs is therefore valuable from a political point of view. While spreads on sovereign
bonds are surely informative in this dimension they always represent an mixture of the
perceived default probability and the repayment conditional on default. Since both
variables are likely to change after the start of a program our narrower focus on defaults
allows us to disentangle those eects. Furthermore, even interest rates on bonds with
longer maturities are partly driven by short term considerations. Our approach is thus
better suited to analyze the long run consequences of IMF interventions.
3. Empirical Framework and Data
3.1. Empirical Framework
The goal of this paper is to analyze the medium and long run eects of IMF programs
on sovereign risk. The literature on the determinants of sovereign defaults therefore
provides a natural starting point for our own investigation. We follow Kohlscheen (2009)
and Celasun and Harms (2010) in using a pooled probit framework for our baseline
estimations employing dummy variables to indicate IMF interventions. We do not opt
for a xed eects estimation procedure since a consistent xed eects probit estimator
does not exist and the alternative use of a logistic distributional assumption still suers
from the drawback of a dramatically reduced sample size. This reduction results from
8the required exclusion of all countries without a default incidence in the sample period
since the xed eect is a perfect predictor of no default for these countries (Kruger and
Messmacher, 2004).11 Instead we decide on the utilization of cluster robust covariance
matrices on the basis of a test for dynamic completeness oered by Wooldridge (2002).12
An obvious objection against this approach points to the long acknowledged endogenous
nature of IMF programs. Since IMF programs are partly designed to avert various forms
of macroeconomic crises the nding of a positive association between IMF interventions
and sovereign risk could reect causality running from the latter to the former. Although
this problem should be mitigated by the adoption of a large number of macroeconomic
control variables and the use of lagged IMF intervention dummies these variables may
still be correlated with the error term. Given the binary nature of our two variables of
interest the preferred framework in this case is the recursive bivariate probit model.13
The bivariate probit model explicitly species the endogenous nature of the binary re-
gressor of interest in a simultaneous equations context. In our case, let D and I denote
the dummy variables indicating a sovereign default and the adoption of an IMF program,
respectively. The model may then be written as
D
 = x
0 +  I + " D = 1 if D
 > 0 (1)
I
 = z
0 +  I = 1 if I
 > 0 (2)








0 ;  1
!
.
Equation (1) describes the ability and the willingness of a sovereign borrower to honor his
debt as a function of his relationship with the IMF and other determinants summarized
in the vector x. Considered in isolation this equation corresponds to the univariate
probit model referred to in the rst part of this paragraph with the coecient  as our
11The inclusion of institutional control variables with almost no time variation raises an additional
problem for every xed eects estimator.
12This test is based on an articial probit regression which includes the lagged residuum of the original
estimation equation as an additional regressor. The null hypothesis is that the coecient on this
new variable takes the value 0. A rejection of the null hypothesis is equivalent to a rejection of the
assumption of dynamic completeness. Cluster robust standard errors are required in this case.
13See Marchesi (2003) for an application of this method to the interaction of IMF programs and debt
reschedulings.
9main object of interest. The desire of the sovereign borrower to participate in an IMF
program and the willingness of the IMF decision-making bodies to implement one is
modeled in equation (2). Although Wilde (2000) notes that parameter identication in
this type of model does not require the variables in x and z to be dierent the theory
and empirics of IMF program participation guides us to select some additional political
and institutional variables in the second equation. Finally, the endogenous nature of
IMF interventions is reected in the correlation between the two error terms " and .
We would expect the estimate of the correlation coecient  to be positive if countries
with a higher probability of default attract more IMF interventions even after controlling
for the variables in x. We estimate all model parameters simultaneously by maximum
likelihood.
3.2. Data
Our empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel of 57 developing and emerging
economies with annual data from 1975 to 2008. Although country coverage is dictated
by the availability of data on our main variables of interest the country list presented in
Appendix A seems to be broad enough to mitigate concerns of sample selection bias.14
We further restrict our sample by excluding the time span between the rst incidence
and the resolution of a default since the duration of a debt restructuring process may well
be inuenced by economic considerations other than the decision to enter the default
status in the rst place (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2009).
We follow Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2009), Kohlscheen (2009) and Celasun and Harms
(2010) in using actual incidences of sovereign defaults on foreign currency debt as re-
ported by the rating agency Standard & Poor's as our dependent variable. Standard
& Poor's denes a sovereign default `...as the failure to meet a principal or interest
payment on the due date (or within the specied grace period) contained in the original
terms of a debt issue' (Standard & Poor's, 2006). This approach identies 60 credit
events in our maximum sample. We decline the attempt to enrich the data by including
periods with high spreads on sovereign bonds (Pescatori and Sy, 2007), private defaults
(Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001) or large IMF drawings (Manasse and Roubini,
2009). While the decision on the last two alternatives is obvious with regard to our
14Formerly central planned economies have been included with data from 1992 onwards.
10research focus the utilization of a market based indicator of sovereign distress is refused
on the grounds of data limitations.15
Our main explanatory variable of interest { the existence of an IMF program { is mea-
sured in three dierent ways. Our broadest indicator is a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 if an IMF program was agreed on in at least one of the ve preceding years.
Since highly subsidized lending through the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) is targeted at low income countries
with little access to private capital markets it qualies more as development assistance
than as intervention in terms of the theoretical arguments laid out above (Barro and
Lee, 2005). We therefore alternatively employ a more selective measure of IMF pro-
grams which focuses on agreed Stand-by Arrangements (SBA) and on the Extended
Fund Facility (EFF). Our third indicator nally marks new SBA and EFF programs
with lending lines in excess of the participating country's quota. This explicit focus on
large programs can be justied in light of some of the theories discussed in subsection
2.1. On the one hand, large programs may be particular successful in reducing sovereign
risk as most theories on liquidity crises agree that the eectiveness of IMF interventions
increases with their size. Additionally one can argue that exceptional access to IMF re-
sources renders further support in the nearby future less likely thereby reducing debtor
moral hazard and sovereign risk (Dreher and Vaubel, 2004). On the other hand, the
accumulation of large liabilities to the IMF may as well increase the probability of a
future solvency crisis implying a default on more junior private debt.
We measure the adoption of an IMF program over a ve year window because we want
to account for both the direct and arguably fast working eect of liquidity provision and
the more time consuming eects that inuence default probabilities through changes in
incentives and policy conduct. In a robustness exercise, however, we will also investigate
whether our conclusions change if a dierent time horizon is considered.
A rst impression on the relation between our dierent indicators of IMF interventions
and subsequent defaults can be gauged from Table 1. This table shows the frequency of
sovereign debt crises conditional upon the existence of an IMF program in the previous
ve years. The striking result from this exercise is that default frequencies of countries
with an IMF involvement in the recent past exceed those without such treatment by a
factor larger than two. This dierence gets bigger when shifting our attention exclusively
15The EMBI Global which covers 41 countries is the broadest sovereign debt index available. Data
coverage, however, is often limited to less then 10 years.
11on SBA and EFF programs and especially on those where the agreed lending amount
is large as dened above. The 2 statistics reject the null hypothesis of independence
between the frequency of sovereign debt crises and IMF programs in all cases implying
that the dierences are statistically signicant. Obviously, correlation does not neces-
sarily imply one-way causality. In the next section we will therefore investigate whether
this positive association still holds after explicitly taking other determinants of sovereign
debt crises and the endogeneity of IMF programs into account.
 insert Table 1 here 
Our choice of control variables in the single-equation framework and in the default equa-
tion (1) of the bivariate probit model has been guided by the literature on sovereign debt
crises and is especially close to the specication of Kohlscheen (2009). The set of covari-
ates consists of the GDP growth rate, the ratios of debt service to exports and reserves
to imports, the external debt to GDP ratio, the ve year US T-Bill rate and a policy
dummy variable indicating parliamentary democracies. We also add regional dummies,
an indicator of compliance with IMF programs proposed by Dreher and Walter (2010)
and interaction terms in some of the specications. To mitigate endogeneity concerns all
variables except for the arguably exogenous policy variable are lagged by one year. The
same economic variables augmented by the short term to total debt ratio (which turns
out insignicant in the default equation) are also considered as potential determinants
of IMF interventions in equation (2) of our bivariate probit specication. Following the
empirical literature on IMF lending decisions we further include the fraction of votes
cast together with the United States in the UN General Assembly as an additional
variable. We use a higher lag order in this specication to ensure that IMF programs
are explained solely by already realized values of the explanatory variables. Appendix B
contains information on the construction and the data sources for the included variables.
The summary statistics are presented in table Table 2.16
 insert Table 2 here 
16We also experimented with other variables proposed in the literature on debt crises and IMF inter-
ventions. In the default equation we tried indicators of real exchange rate overvaluation and banking
crises, the volatility of GDP growth, the decit to GDP ratio, an indicator of the past repayment
performance and the ratio of private to total external debt. Potential explanatory variables for the
IMF equations incorporated each country's share of IMF quotas, the ratio of bilateral trade with the
United States relative to GDP and the fraction of times countries voted in line with major Europe in
the UN General Assembly. However, none of these variables turned out to be statistically signicant
when added to our baseline specication.
12GDP growth should inuence the probability of a default through it's impact on sovereign
borrowers' willingness to pay (Arellano, 2008). We expect to nd a negative relationship
since borrowing constraints often tighten in recessions and a reduction of the debt burden
through net repayment is a less attractive choice in times of economic hardship. The
debt service to exports and reserves to imports ratios are included as measures of a
country's liquidity position. Liquidity features prominently in the literature on self-
fullling debt runs which points to a positive association between liquidity needs and
the incidence of roll-over crises. A similar conclusion can also be reached in a willingness
to pay framework (Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2004). The external debt to GDP
ratio is the most widely used solvency indicator in the political and academic debate
on debt sustainability. We opt for a broad measure of external debt that includes both
private and public liabilities. This choice is motivated by data availability and the
observation that private obligations often turn public through government guarantees
or direct assumptions during nancial and economic crises. Since variations in the
risk free interest rate directly aect the demand for more risky assets like emerging
market government bonds we add the ve year US T-Bill rate as an additional regressor.
Finally, political economy considerations surely inuence the debt service decision. One
particular aspect pointed out by Kohlscheen (2009) is that even heads of government
that are sympathetic to a suspension of payments to international creditors may resist
the temptation to do so when the consent of a polarized legislature is required. We
therefore expect the coecient on the parliamentary democracy dummy to be negative.
Countries seek the help of the IMF in times of looming crisis. Our priors on the co-
ecient signs for the economic variables in the IMF equation therefore coincide with
our expectations laid out in the context of the default equation. As another indicator
of liquidity needs we also anticipate the short term to total debt ratio to enter with a
positive sign. The additional UN voting variable can be seen as a indicator for the po-
litical proximity of a country's government to the United States (Barro and Lee, 2005).
Since it is often assumed that the United States use their inuence as the IMF's major
shareholder to favor political allies with preferred access to Fund resources this variable
is expected to enter with a positive coecient.
134. Results
4.1. Probit Estimates
The basic results of our single equation analysis are summarized in Table 3. We present
marginal eects evaluated at the means of covariates in all columns to ease the economic
interpretation and the comparison between the dierent specications. Since the null
hypothesis of dynamic completeness can not be rejected for any of our model variants
standard inference procedures are valid.17 The t-statistics of the coecient estimates
given in parenthesis are therefore based on usual Huber/White standard errors.
Column (I) presents the estimates for our baseline specication that does not account
for the eects of IMF interventions. Our results closely resemble those of Kohlscheen
(2009) despite the larger time span covered in our analysis. Sovereign defaults become
more likely in recessions, when a high debt service to exports ratio indicates pressing
liquidity needs and when the debt burden is large relative to the economic size of the
debtor country. Higher US interest rates also increase the probability of a sovereign
default which is less common in parliamentary democracies even after controlling for
the other covariates. Finally a large foreign reserves to import ratio is associated with a
lower probability of sovereign debt crisis. The sign of all coecient estimates are in line
with our theoretical predictions. Regarding the goodness of t our pseudo R2 takes a
value of roughly 17.5 percent. This estimate is in the range obtained in previous research
on the determinants of sovereign defaults.
 insert Table 3 here 
Turning to our main variables of interest the remaining columns show that sovereign
debt crises are more likely to occur in the ve years following an IMF program. Im-
portantly, the sign of this eect does not depend on the concept used to identify IMF
interventions although its statistical and economic signicance increases monotonically
from specication (II) to (IV). According to our results the adoption of any kind of IMF
program increases the probability of a subsequent default by 1.4 percentage points in a
sample with an overall default frequency of just 4.8 percent. SBA and EFF programs,
especially large ones, induce an even bigger surge in default probabilities by 1.7 and
17The p-values for the null hypothesis take the values 0.50, 0.47, 0.47 and 0.57 respectively.
142.2 percentage points, respectively. These results support the notion that moral hazard
and debt dilution eects are important byproducts of IMF programs. Since the largest
eects are found for lending programs that exceed a country's quota one may argue that
these problems grow more severe with program size. Another explanation, however,
points to an increased risk of simultaneity bias as large programs are targeted to coun-
tries with deeper structural problems. We therefore do not consider them separately in
the remaining study and focus on all SBA and EFF interventions instead which also
excludes programs that qualify more as development assistance than as crisis prevention
lending.18
The results presented in Table 4 show that our conclusions do not rest on the specic
time horizon employed in the measurement of IMF programs. Countries are more prone
to sovereign debt crises if an IMF intervention took place in the previous four, three,
two or just in the last year. These results are at odds with the idea that IMF lending
prevents looming liquidity crises from unfolding in the short run while induced moral
hazard becomes the dominant eect over a longer time horizon. Instead, the short run
increase in default probabilities may even be seen as supportive of the idea that insu-
cient IMF lending programs trigger sovereign debt crises (Zettelmeyer, 2000). Finally it
can be gauged from column (I) that IMF programs are particulary often accompanied
by sovereign defaults in the year of their implementation. Since the case for reverse
causality is obvious in this specication we do not allow for contemporaneous eects in
the remainder of our paper.
 insert Table 4 here 
In further analyses summarized in Table 5 we explore the robustness of our results to
alternative specications which should also shed some light on the economic forces at
work. One objection against our conclusions is that our IMF coecient just picks up a
geographical clustering in both IMF programs and sovereign debt crises. We test this
hypothesis by including regional dummies in our baseline specication. As the estimates
presented in column (I) show, all of the dummies turn out statistically insignicant while
the sign and magnitude of our coecient of interest is not altered. We are therefore
condent that our nding of a positive eect of IMF programs on sovereign default
probabilities does not merely reect unobserved heterogeneity at the regional level.
18Results for the alternative IMF specications are available upon request.
15 insert Table 5 here 
Another possible explanation for our results points to the problem of non-compliance
with IMF policy conditions. If IMF programs worked mainly through the inuence con-
ditionality exerts on policy choices we would expect a reduction in sovereign risk to be
limited to those countries that meet the conditions laid out in the lending agreement.
Furthermore, governments that fall short of their promises soon after the disbursement
of the rst tranches of IMF credit are likely to be those with a large inclination to default
on their other obligations too. A failure to dierentiate between dierent compliance
rates may therefore bias the coecient on the IMF program variable substantially up-
wards. We address this problem by augmenting our estimation equation with a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if a country was compliant with its IMF program in the
ve preceding years.19 Column (II) of Table 5 shows the results. While theoretically
convincing the distinction between compliers and non-compliers seems to be less impor-
tant empirically. The presence of an IMF program per se increases the probability of a
sovereign debt crisis for both country groups alike. Overall the evidence presented so
far thus weakens the case for the importance of IMF conditionality while it is mostly in
line with the moral hazard, debt dilution, and default triggering views of IMF lending.
The last part of this section puts the implications of the catalytic nance hypothesis un-
der greater scrutiny. As emphasized above this theory implies that liquidity provisions
by the IMF are most likely to induce catalytic eects when the economic fundamentals
of the debtor country are neither too good nor too bad. Following Mody and Saravia
(2006) we integrate this hypothesis in our empirical framework by interacting the IMF
program indicator with dummy variables for a country's relative position in the empiri-
cal distribution of other factors inuencing sovereign risk. More concretely, we construct
three dummy variables for both the external debt to GDP and the debt service to ex-
ports ratio by using the rst and second tertile of the respective distribution as threshold
values. Mirroring the time window employed in the measurement of IMF interventions
every country-year observation is grouped according to its mean value during the ve
preceding years. Columns (III) and (IV) display the results of this exercise. The ev-
idence is broadly supportive to the catalytic nance theory except for one important
qualication. Although the coecients on the IMF variables are always the lowest for
19Concretely, a country is coded as non-compliant when more than 25 % of the credit amount agreed
under an IMF program remains undrawn at program expiration (Dreher and Walter, 2010). The
availability of the compliance variable limits our sample size in this specication.
16the intermediate range of economic fundamentals, they never reach a negative sign. In-
stead of setting the stage for a default risk reducing eect of IMF programs a proper
economic environment merely seems to limit the damage they otherwise cause. Since
a signicant positive coecient on the program variable is only found for the worst set
of economic fundamentals another explanation indicates again the potential problem of
endogeneity which is probably most pronounced for especially crisis-prone countries. We
turn to this hypothesis in the next section.
4.2. Bivariate Probit Estimates
The parameter estimates of our bivariate probit specication are given in the third
and fourth column of Table 6. Notice that these results are not directly comparable
to the marginal eects reported earlier in this section. To allow for an assessment of
the importance of endogeneity we therefore also present results for a specication that
restricts the correlation of the two disturbances in the equations (1) and (2) to zero (see
columns (I) and (II)). This version of the model is equivalent to an estimation of the
two equations by the univariate probit methods employed in the rst part this paper.
 insert Table 6 here 
Turning rst to the determinants of program participation the estimation results of both
the univariate and bivariate specications support the assumption that IMF resources
are targeted to and demanded by countries with weak fundamentals.20 Liquidity needs
in particular seem to be an important aspect that characterizes program countries as
the reserves to imports, the debt service to export and the short term to total debt ratio
all enter signicantly and with the correct sign. This is also true for the GDP growth
rate and the UN voting variable where a positive coecient indicates a preferred access
to Fund resources for countries with closer political ties to the United States.
Most importantly from the perspective of this study a comparison of the univariate and
bivariate regression results shows that our main conclusions are not altered when we ac-
count for the simultaneity of the IMF variable. The coecient on our program indicator
20Since the estimation results for the univariate default specication are discussed at length in sub-
section 4.1 we do not regard them separately here. Dierences in signicance levels are due to
a reduction in sample size brought about by the higher lag order employed in the IMF program
equation.
17even increases slightly from 0.347 to 0.748 from the rst to the latter specication. This
is mirrored in an estimated correlation coecient  which is negative albeit not signif-
icantly so, according to the usual Wald test. The hypothesis of no correlation between
the two error terms is also not rejected by a lagrange multiplier test. Here the test statis-
tic takes the value 1.274, which is well below the critical value for any reasonable level
of signicance. Hence, the positive association between the presence of IMF programs
and subsequent sovereign defaults documented throughout this study does not reect a
correlation in omitted factors which inuence both program adoption and default deci-
sion. Instead, our evidence strongly supports the idea that IMF interventions increase
the likelihood of future debt crises as predicted by the moral hazard, debt dilution, and
default triggering theories of IMF lending.
5. Conclusion
Although the IMF features prominently both in the history of sovereign debt crises and in
recent policy proposals aimed at the prevention of such crises, surprisingly little is known
on the eects of IMF program participation on the likelihood of subsequent defaults.
In light of the inconclusive ndings in the theoretical literature this paper attempts to
investigate this issue empirically. Using univariate and bivariate probit specications our
results indicate that the adoption of an IMF program increases sovereign risk over the
medium term. More concretely, we estimate that the probability of a sovereign default
increases by approximately 1.5 to 2 percentage points in the aftermath of IMF programs.
These ndings cannot be contributed to a lack of compliance with conditionality but
seem to reect the eects of IMF interventions per se. Financial markets' cautious
reaction to Greece's rescue package described in the introduction of this paper thus
seems legitimate in the light of these results.
Further analyses additionally show that IMF programs are especially detrimental to scal
solvency when Fund resources are targeted to countries with already weak fundamentals.
Overall, our evidence is therefore consistent with the idea that debtor moral hazard
is most likely to occur in these situations as predicted by the theoretical work on the
catalytic nance hypothesis. Other explanations that point to the eects of debt dilution
and the possibility of IMF triggered debt runs, however, are also possible. The separation
of the eects in terms of these dierent explanations surely constitutes an interesting
area for future research.
18Regarding the policy implications of our ndings, one important qualication has to be
kept in mind before concluding that debt crises would become less likely in a world with-
out IMF interventions. Since the pure existence of the IMF as a potential international
lender of last resort may deter short-run creditors from running it is possible that the
Fund has prevented several debt crises without being active. This possibility, however,
should not preclude the IMF from a thorough analysis of the question whether too many
resources have been devoted to countries which view IMF lending as a substitute for,
rather than a complement to policy reform.
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24Table 1: Sovereign Debt Crises: Frequency Conditional on IMF Programs
Frequency (%)
Yes No 2y
New IMF program in 5.02 2.40 10:64
previous 5 years?
New Standby or Extended Fund 5.79 2.26 18:05
Facility Arrangements in previous 5 years?
New large Standby or Extended Fund 10.50 2.71 32:64
Facility Arrangements in previous 5 years?
†The null hypothesis of independence between the frequency of sovereign debt crises and
IMF programs is distributed as 2(1). ,  and  denote signicance levels of 1%, 5%
, and 10%.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Max Min Obs.
Default 0.05 0.21 1.00 0.00 1256
IMF program in previous 5 years 0.57 0.49 1.00 0.00 1256
SBA/EFF program in previous 5 years 0.47 0.50 1.00 0.00 1256
SBA/EFF 100 program in previous 5 years 0.13 0.33 1.00 0.00 1252
Compliant with IMF in previous 5 years 0.70 0.46 1.00 0.00 988
GDP growtht 1 0.04 0.05 0.27 -0.23 1256
Debt service/exportst 1 0.21 0.15 1.29 0.00 1256
Reserves/importst 1 0.37 0.34 2.79 0.00 1256
External debt/GDPt 1 0.49 0.31 3.36 0.03 1256
5-year T-Bill ratet 1 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.03 1256
Parliamentary Democracy 0.22 0.42 1.00 0.00 1256
log(UN voting)t 6 -1.62 0.52 -0.58 -4.68 1233
Short term/total debtt 6 0.13 0.10 0.65 0.00 1223
All statistics refer to the baseline estimation sample, Table 3, Column (II).
25Table 3: IMF Programs and Sovereign Debt Crises: Baseline Estimations
(marginal eects, evaluated at means of covariates)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Dependent variable: Default
IMF program in previous 5 years 0.014
(1.65)
SBA/EFF program in previous 5 years 0.017
(2.13)
SBA/EFF 100 program in previous 5 years 0.022
(2.33)
GDP growtht 1 -0.223 -0.207 -0.199 -0.222
(2.91) (2.71) (2.68) (2.94)
Debt service/exportst 1 0.109 0.102 0.093 0.091
(4.94) (4.67) (4.25) (4.06)
Reserves/importst 1 -0.044 -0.038 -0.036 -0.043
(1.65) (1.46) (1.42) (1.62)
External debt/GDPt 1 0.018 0.015 0.018 0.019
(1.84) (1.60) (1.93) (2.00)
5-year T-Bill ratet 1 0.452 0.483 0.459 0.396
(3.08) (3.34) (3.24) (2.75)
Parliamentary Democracy -0.029 -0.028 -0.028 -0.030
(2.52) (2.45) (2.53) (2.58)
Observations 1.256 1.256 1.256 1.252
Defaults 60 60 60 60
Mc Fadden R2 0.174 0.179 0.184 0.186
Log likelihood -199.15 -197.87 -196.80 -196.09
The absolute values of robust (Huber/White) z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ,
 and  denote signicance levels of 1%, 5% , and 10%.
26Table 4: IMF Programs and Sovereign Debt Crises: Alternative Time Horizons
(marginal eects, evaluated at means of covariates)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Dependent variable: Default
SBA/EFF program 0.029
in same year (3.45)
SBA/EFF program 0.021
in previous year (2.33)
SBA/EFF program 0,021
in previous 2 years (2,81)
SBA/EFF program 0.016
in previous 3 years (2.06)
SBA/EFF program 0.010
in previous 4 years (1.28)
GDP growtht 1 -0.181 -0.194 -0,181 -0.195 -0.206
(2.37) (2.53) (2,44) (2.60) (2.68)
Debt service/exportst 1 0.090 0.100 0,093 0.096 0.101
(4.28) (4.78) (4,44) (4.42) (4.45)
Reserves/importst 1 -0.031 -0.039 -0,038 -0.038 -0.040
(1.26) (1.54) (1,54) (1.51) (1.53)
External debt/GDPt 1 0.018 0.017 0,016 0.017 0.018
(2.03) (1.79) (1,79) (1.85) (1.86)
5-year T-Bill ratet 1 0.429 0.430 0,428 0.444 0.454
(2.97) (3.00) (3,07) (3.09) (3.14)
Parliamentary Democracy -0.029 -0.028 -0,028 -0.029 -0.029
(2.66) (2.54) (2,63) (2.59) (2.55)
Observations 1.256 1.256 1.256 1.256 1.256
Defaults 60 60 60 60 60
Mc Fadden R2 0.197 0.186 0,191 0.183 0.177
Log likelihood -193.53 -196.25 -195.09 -196.96 -198.26
The absolute values of robust (Huber/White) z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ,
 and  denote signicance levels of 1%, 5% , and 10%.
27Table 5: IMF Programs and Sovereign Debt Crises: Robustness
(marginal eects, evaluated at means of covariates)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Dependent variable: Default
SBA/EFF program in previous 5 years 0.015 0.020
(1.99) (1.74)
Compliant with IMF in previous 5 years 0.008
(0.66)
SBA/EFF programm in previous 5 years,
low range of External debt / GDP (III) 0.016 0.021
or Debt service / exports (IV) (1.35) (1.37)
medium range of External debt / GDP (III) 0.005 0.001
or Debt service / exports (IV) (0.51) (0.10)
high range of External debt / GDP (III) 0.025 0.023
or Debt service / exports (IV) (2.63) (2.46)
GDP growtht 1 -0.156 -0.248 -0.210 -0.192
(2.28) (2.34) (2.84) (2.33)
Debt service/exportst 1 0.077 0.133 0.096 0.080
(3.88) (4.15) (4.48) (3.23)
Reserves/importst 1 -0.038 -0.044 -0.037 -0.036
(1.63) (1.29) (1.51) (1.43)
External debt/GDPt 1 0.021 0.025 0.010 0.016
(2.40) (1.89) (1.05) (1.69)
5-year T-Bill ratet 1 0.432 0.590 0.444 0.477
(3.47) (2.97) (3.13) (3.43)
Parliamentary Democracy -0.021 -0.036 -0.028 -0.033
(1.70) (2.33) (2.54) (2.75)
Latin America & Caribbean 0.016
(1.45)
Middle East & North Africa -0.025
(1.62)
East Asia & Pacic -0.001
(0.10)
Sub Saharan Africa 0.010
(0.79)
Observations 1.256 988 1.250 1.170
Defaults 60 58 60 58
Mc Fadden R2 0.206 0.162 0.190 0.194
Log likelihood -191.43 -194.95 -192.92 -186.04
The absolute values of robust (Huber/White) z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ,
, and  denote signicance levels of 1%, 5% , and 10%.
28Table 6: IMF Programs and Sovereign Debt Crises: Bivariate Probit Estimation
Probit Bivariate Probit
Variable Coef. Z-statistic Coef. Z-statistic
Dependent variable: Default
Constant  2.857 (7.74)  2.967 (8.59)
GDP growtht 1 -2.180 (1.29) -2.022 (1.06)
Debt service/exportst 1 1.730 (3.79) 1.540 (2.59)
Reserves/importst 1 -0.570 (1.46) -0.541 (1.68)
External debt/GDPt 1 0.350 (1.69) 0.344 (1.39)
5-year T-Bill ratet 1 9.319 (3.38) 9.001 (3.26)
Parliamentary Democracy -0.884 (2.81) -0.872 (2.41)
SBA/EFF program in previous 5 years 0.347 (2.11) 0.748 (1.79)
Dependent variable: SBA/EFF program
y
Constant 0.771 (3.33) 0.744 (3.11)
GDP growtht 6 -5.716 (5.90) -5.689 (5.78)
Reserves/importst 6 -1.031 (5.16) -1.056 (5.33)
log(UN voting)t 6 0.807 (6.49) 0.792 (6.11)
Short term/total debtt 6 1.651 (3.81) 1.744 (4.05)








y Additional decade dummies used. z The likelihood ratio test statistic is distributed
2(1). , , and  denote signicance levels of 1%, 5% , and 10%.
29Appendix A. Country Coverage
Argentina El Salvador Madagascar Romania
Benin Fiji Malaysia Russian Federation
Bolivia Georgia Mali Senegal
Botswana Ghana Mexico South Africa
Brazil Guatemala Mongolia Sri Lanka
Bulgaria India Morocco Thailand
Burkina Faso Indonesia Mozambique Tunisia
Cameroon Jamaica Nigeria Turkey
Chile Jordan Pakistan Ukraine
China Kazakhstan Panama Uruguay
Colombia Kenya Papua New Guinea Venezuela
Costa Rica Latvia Paraguay Vietnam
Dominican Republic Lebanon Peru
Ecuador Lithuania Philippines
Egypt, Arab Rep. Macedonia, FYR Poland
30Appendix B. Data Sources and Denitions
Name Source Denition
Dependent variable
Default Standard & Poor's (2006,
2009)
Dummy variable coded as 1 in the rst year
of a sovereign default.
IMF variables
IMF program Dreher (2006) - Extended
time covering from web site
IMF program agreed, dummy variable.
SBA/EFF pro-
gram
Dreher (2006) - Extended
time covering from web site
IMF Standby Arrangement or Extended




IMF (2009) Change in total agreed SBA and EFF loans




Dreher and Walter (2010) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
a country was compliant with its IMF pro-
gram. Non-compliance is identied as peri-
ods where at least 25% of the agreed credit
amount remained undrawn at program ex-
piration.
continued on next page





World Bank (2010) Ratio of debt service on external debt to ex-
ports of goods and services
Reserves/
imports
World Bank (2010) Ratio of total reserves minus gold to imports
of goods and services
Democratic Polity IV (2009) Dummy indicating democratic regimes,
identied as country-year observations with
non-negativ POLITY score as in Kohlscheen
(2009).
Parliamentary Keefer (2009) Dummy signalizing a parliamentary form of
government as indicated by a value of 2 for
the system variable as in Kohlscheen (2009).
Parliamentary
Democracy
Polity IV (2009) and Keefer
(2009)
Dummy variable coded as 1 for parliamen-
tary democracies. The construction of this
variable relies on the denition of the Demo-
cratic and Parliamentary dummy variables
given above.
GDP growth World Bank (2010) Real GDP growth rate
5 year T-Bill
rate
FRED (2010) Yield to maturity of US T-Bills with a con-
stant maturity of 5 years
External
debt/GDP
World Bank (2010) Ratio of external debt stocks to GDP
Short term/
total debt
World Bank (2010) Ratio of short term to total external debt
UN voting Dreher and Sturm (2010) Fraction of votes a country cast together
with the United States in the UN General
Assembly
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